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Introduction
Looking at the fate of the fifteen states that emerged from the Soviet Union, we find it striking how different their economic evolution has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. One especially interesting feature is that the three Baltic States that are now members of the European Union (EU) have fared so much better in Under Soviet rule, the economic decline of the three Baltic republics -Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -was substantial but, overall, their economic situation remained Georgia not grow more rapidly than Estonia thereafter?
To repeat, Estonia has had a double advantage over Georgia. Estonia grew much more rapidly from 1991 to 2006 both because the initial slump of output was shallower and more short-lived than in Georgia and also because, after the slump, Estonia managed to grow more rapidly than Georgia despite Georgia's much lower initial level of output per person when growth resumed in 1994.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out, in the simplest possible terms, the theoretical framework guiding the discussion to follow. In Section 3, selected economic, political, and social indicators are employed to illuminate the possible reasons for the divergent economic developments in the two countries under review. In Section 4, before summarizing our main findings, we briefly discuss the policy implications of the growth experiences of the two countries and suggest potential lessons for other countries that lag behind their erstwhile equals. Dixit, 2004) . We want to ascertain whether the growth differential between Estonia and Georgia since 1991 can be traced mostly to efficiency (i.e., intensive growth), as we suspect, rather than accumulation (i.e., extensive growth).
Theoretical Background
To set the stage, consider the constant-returns-to-scale production function:
Here Y is national economic output, A is a parameter that reflects total factor productivity (TFP), or efficiency, that is, the ability to convert inputs into output, H is human capital, K is real capital, N is natural capital, including land, and L is raw labor. The four exponents are the output elasticities of the inputs and lie between zero and one. By dividing through the production function by labor, we obtain this standard expression for output per person:
Hence, output per capita depends on four factors: is that just as, in nature, some plants grow faster than others, so do different types of capital grow at different rates. While experience suggests that real capital grows at roughly the same rate as output over long periods, rendering the capital/output ratio constant over time, human capital can easily grow more rapidly than real capital, while natural capital -certainly that part of it that is nonrenewable, but also some renewable natural capital such as fish in the sea -tends to grow less rapidly than real capital. This, by the way -or think of fixed land, if you prefer -is why increased population growth, against common intuition, tends to slow down economic growth.
Different growth rates of the different determinants of economic growth mean that the rate of growth of output per capita must be a weighted combination of the growth rates of the different inputs. We could simplify the story by imposing on the production function the requirement that capital and output grow in tandem. If we did, as is customary in parts of the growth literature, this would reduce the number of the determinants of long-run growth from four to three: efficiency, human capital per person, and natural capital per person. We do not, however, pursue this simplification here because we want to emphasize not so much long-run growth of potential output as the medium-term growth of the actual level of output. In our equations above, the efficiency parameter A comprises a variety of factors, among them technological advances and other types of efficiency gains from various sources, including internal as well as external trade, "good" institutions, and "good" governance (Williamson, 2005; see also Marsiliani and Renström, 2007) . Governance, in turn, is a broad concept, and subsumes managerial, fiscal, monetary, financial, and external governance, each of which comprises several components.
The examination of some of these "unbundled" governance factors is at the core of our attempt to answer the question of why Estonia has grown so much more rapidly than Georgia. This requires a comparative review of a number of different economic, political, and social indicators to which we now turn.
Empirical Evidence
We are aware that fifteen years of macroeconomic data following the collapse of the Soviet Union that started in 1989 is too short a period to be amenable to a fully fledged long-run economic growth analysis in the spirit of, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) . Instead, against the background provided in the preceding section, we intend to ask whether the pattern of those macroeconomic variables that recent growth research has identified as potentially important determinants of output per person and thereby also ultimately of long-run economic growth in cross-country comparisons have behaved in ways that can shed some light on economic developments in Estonia and Georgia since independence. Full-fledged growth accounting in which output growth could be traced in quantifiable proportions to the underlying inputs and the efficiency with which they were used is beyond the scope of the present exercise.
A. Investment and Education
Let us start with domestic investment, a key determinant of the capital/labor ratio and of economic growth. Which of the two countries has put aside more resources for Today, the people of Estonia enjoy a markedly higher standard of life than they did under Soviet rule whereas the people of Georgia remain significantly worse off (recall Figures 1 and 2) . Price stability is also good for growth. Figure 9 shows that in the 1990s Georgia managed to bring inflation down almost as far as Estonia. However, in the early 1990s inflation was much higher in Georgia than in Estonia as a result of severe initial monetary overhang and other problems. It is, therefore, not surprising that the process of monetization of economic transactions has been slower in Georgia than in Estonia (Figure 10 ). Most African countries have a higher ratio of broad money to GDP -that is, greater financial depth -than Georgia. High inflation tends to hold back economic growth through various channels. It tends to do so by reducing financial depth, among other things, or, if you prefer, by discouraging the accumulation of financial capital, thus depriving the economic system of necessary lubrication in the form of adequate liquidity, and insufficient lubrication hampers economic efficiency and growth.
B. Exports, Inflation, and Economic Structure
Even though inflation has been largely brought under control, macroeconomic management and organization remain problematic in Georgia. The interest-rate spread -that is, the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits -is a simple measure of the efficiency of the banking system the commercial part of which, by the late 1990s, had in both countries been put into private hands. In
Estonia foreigners own almost all banks assets compared with about two thirds in To give one more example, in Estonia, tax rates were cited as a major business constraint by three percent of the managers surveyed in 2005 compared with 36 percent in Georgia. These numbers suggest that different standards of governance may help explain why the transition from agriculture to manufacturing, trade, and services has been slower in Georgia than in Estonia.
To recapitulate, economic growth requires capital to be accumulated and to be efficiently used: real capital, human capital, foreign capital, and financial capital, all of which we have covered thus far, and also social capital to which we now turn.
C. Democracy, Governance, and Demography
Due to the difficult status of its Russian citizens, Estonia does not score as high in (Figure 13 ). Democracy, we think, is good for growth because it improves governance. Democratization can be viewed as an investment in social capital by which we mean the infrastructural glue that holds society together and keeps it working harmoniously and well. Social capital comprises several other ingredients, including trust, the absence of rampant corruption, and reasonable equality in the distribution of income and wealth (see Paldam and Svendsen, 2000) . The idea here is that political oppression, corruption, and excessive inequalities tend to diminish social cohesion and thereby also the quantity or quality of social capital.
According to the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, about the same proportion of managers surveyed in 2005 said they lacked confidence in the court system to uphold property rights (30 percent in Estonia, 29 percent in Georgia). Even so, in Estonia, only two percent of the managers surveyed described their lack of confidence in the courts as a major business constraint compared with twelve percent in Georgia. In Estonia, two percent of the managers surveyed described crime as a major business constraint compared with 24 percent in Georgia. Further, according to Transparency
International, there is a marked difference between Estonia and Georgia in terms of corruption. Figure 14 shows a three-to-four-point difference between the corruption perceptions indices for Estonia and Georgia. The World Bank reports a similar finding. In 2005, 20 percent of managers surveyed in Georgia described corruption as a major constraint on their business operations compared with four percent of managers in Estonia. Since 1999, Estonia has made some progress in the battle against corruption. However, Georgia has not, and remains one of the most corrupt countries in the region, and the world. This probably makes a difference because corruption is not good for growth (Mauro, 1995 ; see also Bardhan, 1997) . Georgian managers say they have to spend three percent of their time dealing with officials compared with two percent in Estonia.
The distribution of income has become somewhat less unequal in Estonia than in Georgia; in 2003, the Gini index of inequality was 36 in Estonia and 40 in Georgia, whereas in the late 1990s it was 38 in both countries. (ii) Monetary and fiscal policies that support price stability and sound private banking and other financial intermediation, sustainable government budget positions, and international, consumer-friendly competition.
(iii) Sound and transparent societal institutions that support the rule of law.
(iv) Good governance of both the public sector and the private sector.
By and large, it seems that on all counts Estonia, up to now, has surpassed Georgia.
While recent developments and data suggest that Georgia, at last, has begun to catch up, doubts remain regarding the country's institutional reform agenda as well as the still unresolved territorial disputes.
Referring back to the classification of the main determinants of economic efficiency and growth implied by the aggregate production function presented in Section 2, we can now summarize our findings as follows.
First, Estonia has invested significantly more relative to GDP than Georgia and also attracted more foreign investment than Georgia, thereby accumulating capital and increasing output per person. Increased high-quality investment contributes to more rapid growth over long periods, other things being the same.
In second place, Estonia sends more young people to secondary schools as well as to colleges and universities than Georgia does, thereby building up precious human capital that, like real capital accumulation, helps lift output per person to higher levels and encourage long-term growth. Estonia's strong emphasis on education at all levels is reinforced by its rapidly increasing technological sophistication as evidenced by widespread personal computer and mobile phone ownership.
Third, Estonia has done more than Georgia to increase economic efficiency -that is, total factor productivity. This effort has taken many different forms. In view of all this, we are not surprised that Estonia has grown more rapidly than Georgia, despite Georgia's advantage of starting from a much lower level of initial income after the plunge following independence. Our story suggests that the growth differential between the two countries since 1993 would probably have been significantly larger than half a percentage point -that is, the difference between Estonia's 6.6 percent growth per year and Georgia's 6.1 percent -had both countries started out in the same initial position. The proportions in which these many different factors account for the growth differential between the two countries since 1991 remain to be quantified. Even so, we think the qualitative point we have made is pretty clear. You judge. 
